Android 會持續改善安全性功能和服務。請參閱左側導覽面板中各版本的強化功能清單。
Android 14
每個 Android 版本都包含數十項安全性強化功能,可保護使用者。以下列舉 Android 14 提供的一些主要安全性強化功能:
- 在 Android 10 中推出的 Hardware-assisted AddressSanitizer (HWASan) 是一款記憶體錯誤偵測工具,類似 AddressSanitizer。Android 14 為 HWASan 帶來顯著改善。瞭解如何防止錯誤進入 Android 版本,HWAddressSanitizer
- 在 Android 14 中,如果應用程式會與第三方分享位置資料,系統執行階段權限對話方塊現在會包含可點選的部分,醒目顯示應用程式的資料分享做法,包括應用程式決定與第三方分享資料的原因等資訊。
- Android 12 推出了在數據機層級停用 2G 支援的選項,可保護使用者免於 2G 過時安全性模型的固有安全性風險。由於禁用 2G 對企業客戶來說至關重要,Android 14 會在 Android Enterprise 中啟用這項安全防護功能,為 IT 管理員提供支援,以便限制受管理裝置降級至 2G 連線。
- 新增支援功能,可拒絕空值加密的行動網路連線,確保電路交換語音和簡訊流量一律加密,並受到保護,避免遭到被動式無線攔截。進一步瞭解 Android 的行動網路連線強化計畫。
- 新增對多個 IMEI 的支援
- 自 Android 14 起,如果裝置支援加速加密指令,則 AES-HCTR2 是檔案名稱加密的首選模式。
- 行動網路連線能力
- 新增 Android 安全中心說明文件
- 如果您的應用程式指定 Android 14 為目標版本,並且使用動態程式碼載入 (DCL),則所有動態載入的檔案都必須標示為唯讀。否則系統會擲回例外狀況。我們建議應用程式盡量避免使用動態載入程式碼,否則應用程式很可能會因為程式碼插入或竄改程式碼而無法正常運作。
Android 13
Every Android release includes dozens of security enhancements to protect users. Here are some of the major security enhancements available in Android 13:
- Android 13 adds multi-document presentation support. This new Presentation Session interface enables an app to do a multi-document presentation, something which isn't possible with the existing API. For further information, refer to Identity Credential
- In Android 13, intents originating from external apps are delivered to an exported component if and only if the intents match their declared intent-filter elements.
- Open Mobile API (OMAPI) is a standard API used to communicate with a device's Secure Element. Before Android 13, only apps and framework modules had access to this interface. By converting it to a vendor stable interface, HAL modules are also capable of communicating with the secure elements through the OMAPI service. For more information, see OMAPI Vendor Stable Interface.
- As of Android 13-QPR, shared UIDs are deprecated. Users of Android 13 or higher should put the line `android:sharedUserMaxSdkVersion="32"` in their manifest. This entry prevents new users from getting a shared UID. For further information on UIDs, see App signing.
- Android 13 added support Keystore symmetric cryptographic primitives such as AES (Advanced Encryption Standard), HMAC (Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code), and asymmetric cryptographic algorithms (including Elliptic Curve, RSA2048, RSA4096, and Curve 25519)
- Android 13 (API level 33) and higher supports a runtime permission for sending non-exempt notifications from an app. This gives users control over which permission notifications they see.
- Added per-use prompt for apps requesting access to all device logs, giving users the ability to allow or deny access.
- introduced the Android Virtualization Framework (AVF), which brings together different hypervisors under one framework with standardized APIs. It provides secure and private execution environments for executing workloads isolated by hypervisor.
- Introduced APK signature scheme v3.1 All new key rotations that use apksigner use the v3.1 signature scheme by default to target rotation for Android 13 and higher.
Check out our full AOSP release notes and the Android Developer features and changes list.
Android 12
每個 Android 版本都包含數十項安全性強化功能,可保護使用者。以下是 Android 12 提供的一些主要安全性強化功能:
- Android 12 推出了 BiometricManager.Strings API,可為使用 BiometricPrompt 進行驗證的應用程式提供本地化字串。這些字串可讓系統辨識裝置,並進一步提供可能使用的驗證類型。Android 12 也支援螢幕下指紋感應器
- 新增對螢幕下指紋感應器的支援
- 指紋 Android 介面定義語言 (AIDL) 簡介
- 支援新的 Face AIDL
- 介紹 Rust 做為平台開發語言
- 新增使用者僅授予大概位置的存取權選項
- 在應用程式使用相機或麥克風時,在狀態列上新增隱私權指標
- Android 的 Private Compute Core (PCC)
- 新增停用 2G 支援功能的選項
Android 11
每個 Android 版本都包含數十項安全性強化功能,可保護使用者。如需 Android 11 中提供的部分主要安全性強化功能清單,請參閱 Android 版本資訊。
Android 10
Every Android release includes dozens of security enhancements to protect users. Android 10 includes several security and privacy enhancements. See the Android 10 release notes for a complete list of changes in Android 10.
Security
BoundsSanitizer
Android 10 deploys BoundsSanitizer (BoundSan) in Bluetooth and codecs. BoundSan uses UBSan's bounds sanitizer. This mitigation is enabled on a per-module level. It helps keep critical components of Android secure and shouldn't be disabled. BoundSan is enabled in the following codecs:
libFLAC
libavcdec
libavcenc
libhevcdec
libmpeg2
libopus
libvpx
libspeexresampler
libvorbisidec
libaac
libxaac
Execute-only memory
By default, executable code sections for AArch64 system binaries are marked execute-only (nonreadable) as a hardening mitigation against just-in-time code reuse attacks. Code that mixes data and code together and code that purposefully inspects these sections (without first remapping the memory segments as readable) no longer functions. Apps with a target SDK of Android 10 (API level 29 or higher) are impacted if the app attempts to read code sections of execute-only memory (XOM) enabled system libraries in memory without first marking the section as readable.
Extended access
Trust agents, the underlying mechanism used by tertiary authentication mechanisms such as Smart Lock, can only extend unlock in Android 10. Trust agents can no longer unlock a locked device and can only keep a device unlocked for a maximum of four hours.
Face authentication
Face authentication allows users to unlock their device simply by looking at the front of their device. Android 10 adds support for a new face authentication stack that can securely process camera frames, preserving security and privacy during face authentication on supported hardware. Android 10 also provides an easy way for security-compliant implementations to enable app integration for transactions such as online banking or other services.
Integer Overflow Sanitization
Android 10 enables Integer Overflow Sanitization (IntSan) in software codecs. Ensure that playback performance is acceptable for any codecs that aren't supported in the device's hardware. IntSan is enabled in the following codecs:
libFLAC
libavcdec
libavcenc
libhevcdec
libmpeg2
libopus
libvpx
libspeexresampler
libvorbisidec
Modular system components
Android 10 modularizes some Android system components and enables them to be updated outside of the normal Android release cycle. Some modules include:
- Android Runtime
- Conscrypt
- DNS Resolver
- DocumentsUI
- ExtServices
- Media
- ModuleMetadata
- Networking
- PermissionController
- Time Zone Data
OEMCrypto
Android 10 uses OEMCrypto API version 15.
Scudo
Scudo is a dynamic user-mode memory allocator designed to be more resilient against heap-related vulnerabilities. It provides the standard C allocation and deallocation primitives, as well as the C++ primitives.
ShadowCallStack
ShadowCallStack
(SCS)
is an LLVM
instrumentation mode that protects against return address overwrites (like
stack buffer overflows) by saving a function's return address to a separately
allocated ShadowCallStack
instance in the function prolog of
nonleaf functions and loading the return address from the
ShadowCallStack
instance in the function epilog.
WPA3 and Wi-Fi Enhanced Open
Android 10 adds support for the Wi-Fi Protected Access 3 (WPA3) and Wi-Fi Enhanced Open security standards to provide better privacy and robustness against known attacks.
Privacy
App access when targeting Android 9 or lower
If your app runs on Android 10 or higher but targets Android 9 (API level 28) or lower, the platform applies the following behavior:
- If your app declares a
<uses-permission>
element for eitherACCESS_FINE_LOCATION
orACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION
, the system automatically adds a<uses-permission>
element forACCESS_BACKGROUND_LOCATION
during installation. - If your app requests either
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION
orACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION
, the system automatically addsACCESS_BACKGROUND_LOCATION
to the request.
Background activity restrictions
Starting in Android 10, the system places restrictions
on starting activities from the background. This behavior change helps
minimize interruptions for the user and keeps the user more in control of what's
shown on their screen. As long as your app starts activities as a direct result
of user interaction, your app most likely isn't affected by these restrictions.
To learn more about the recommended alternative to starting activities from
the background, see the guide on how to alert
users of time-sensitive events in your app.
Camera metadata
Android 10 changes the breadth of information that the getCameraCharacteristics()
method returns by default. In particular, your app must have the CAMERA
permission in order to access potentially device-specific metadata that is
included in this method's return value.
To learn more about these changes, see the section about camera
fields that require permission.
Clipboard data
Unless your app is the default input method editor (IME) or is the app that currently has focus, your app cannot access clipboard data on Android 10 or higher.
Device location
To support the additional control that users have over an app's access to
location information, Android 10 introduces the ACCESS_BACKGROUND_LOCATION
permission.
Unlike the ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION
and ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION
permissions, the ACCESS_BACKGROUND_LOCATION
permission only affects
an app's access to location when it runs in the background. An app is considered
to be accessing location in the background unless one of the following
conditions is satisfied:
- An activity belonging to the app is visible.
- The app is running a foreground service that has declared a foreground
service type of
location
.
To declare the foreground service type for a service in your app, set your app'stargetSdkVersion
orcompileSdkVersion
to29
or higher. Learn more about how foreground services can continue user-initiated actions that require access to location.
External storage
By default, apps targeting Android 10 and higher are given scoped access into external storage, or scoped storage. Such apps can see the following types of files within an external storage device without needing to request any storage-related user permissions:
- Files in the app-specific directory, accessed using
getExternalFilesDir()
. - Photos, videos, and audio clips that the app created from the media store.
To learn more about scoped storage, as well as how to share, access, and modify files that are saved on external storage devices, see the guides on how to manage files in external storage and access and modify media files.
MAC address randomization
On devices that run Android 10 or higher, the system transmits randomized MAC
addresses by default.
If your app handles an enterprise use case, the
platform provides APIs for several operations related to MAC addresses:
- Obtain randomized MAC address: Device owner apps and
profile owner apps can retrieve the randomized MAC address assigned to a
specific network by calling
getRandomizedMacAddress()
. - Obtain actual, factory MAC address: Device owner apps can
retrieve a device's actual hardware MAC address by calling
getWifiMacAddress()
. This method is useful for tracking fleets of devices.
Non-resettable device identifiers
Starting in Android 10, apps must have the
READ_PRIVILEGED_PHONE_STATE
privileged permission in order to
access the device's non-resettable identifiers, which include both IMEI and
serial number.
Build
TelephonyManager
If your app doesn't have the permission and you try asking for information about non-resettable identifiers anyway, the platform's response varies based on target SDK version:
- If your app targets Android 10 or higher, a
SecurityException
occurs. - If your app targets Android 9 (API level 28) or lower, the method returns
null
or placeholder data if the app has theREAD_PHONE_STATE
permission. Otherwise, aSecurityException
occurs.
Physical activity recognition
Android 10 introduces the android.permission.ACTIVITY_RECOGNITION
runtime permission for apps that need to detect the user's step count or
classify the user's physical activity, such as walking, biking, or moving in a
vehicle. This is designed to give users visibility of how device sensor data is
used in Settings.
Some libraries within Google Play services, such as the Activity
Recognition API and the Google
Fit API, don't provide results unless the user has granted your app this
permission.
The only built-in
sensors on the device that require you to declare this permission are the step
counter and step
detector sensors.
If your app targets Android 9 (API level 28) or lower, the system
auto-grants the android.permission.ACTIVITY_RECOGNITION
permission
to your app, as needed, if your app satisfies each of the following
conditions:
- The manifest file includes the
com.google.android.gms.permission.ACTIVITY_RECOGNITION
permission. - The manifest file doesn't include the
android.permission.ACTIVITY_RECOGNITION
permission.
If the system-auto grants the
android.permission.ACTIVITY_RECOGNITION
permission, your app
retains the permission after you update your app to target Android 10. However,
the user can revoke this permission at any time in system settings.
/proc/net filesystem restrictions
On devices that run Android 10 or higher, apps cannot access
/proc/net
, which includes information about a device's network
state. Apps that need access to this information, such as VPNs, should use the
NetworkStatsManager
or ConnectivityManager
class.
Permission groups removed from UI
As of Android 10, apps cannot look up how permissions are grouped in the UI.
Removal of contacts affinity
Starting in Android 10, the platform doesn't keep track of contacts affinity
information. As a result, if your app conducts a search on the user's contacts,
the results aren't ordered by frequency of interaction.
The guide about ContactsProvider
contains a notice describing
the specific fields
and methods that are obsolete on all devices starting in Android 10.
Restricted access to screen contents
To protect users' screen contents, Android 10 prevents silent access to the
device's screen contents by changing the scope of the
READ_FRAME_BUFFER
, CAPTURE_VIDEO_OUTPUT
, and
CAPTURE_SECURE_VIDEO_OUTPUT
permissions. As of Android 10, these
permissions are signature-access
only.
Apps that need to access the device's screen contents should use the
MediaProjection
API, which displays a prompt asking the user to provide consent.
USB device serial number
If your app targets Android 10 or higher, your app cannot read the serial
number until the user has granted your app permission to access the USB device
or accessory.
To learn more about working with USB devices, see the guide on how to configure
USB hosts.
Wi-Fi
Apps targeting Android 10 or higher cannot enable or disable Wi-Fi. The
WifiManager.setWifiEnabled()
method always returns false
.
If you need to prompt users to enable and disable Wi-Fi, use a settings
panel.
Restrictions on direct access to configured Wi-Fi networks
To protect user privacy, manual configuration of the list of Wi-Fi networks
is restricted to system apps and device policy
controllers (DPCs). A given DPC can be either the device owner or the
profile owner.
If your app targets Android 10 or higher, and it isn't a system app or a
DPC, then the following methods don't return useful data:
- The
getConfiguredNetworks()
method always returns an empty list. - Each network operation method that returns an integer value—
addNetwork()
andupdateNetwork()
—always returns -1. - Each network operation that returns a boolean value—
removeNetwork()
,reassociate()
,enableNetwork()
,disableNetwork()
,reconnect()
, anddisconnect()
—always returnsfalse
.
Android 9
每個 Android 版本都包含數十項安全性強化功能,可保護使用者。如需 Android 9 中提供的部分主要安全性增強功能清單,請參閱 Android 版本資訊。
Android 8
每個 Android 版本都包含數十項安全性強化功能,可保護使用者。以下列舉 Android 8.0 提供的一些主要安全性強化功能:
- 加密。新增支援在工作資料夾中移除鍵的功能。
- 驗證開機程序。新增 Android 驗證開機程序 (AVB)。已驗證的 Boot 程式碼庫,可在 AOSP 中新增用於開機載入器的回溯保護機制。建議為 HLOS 提供復原保護機制的啟動載入程式支援。建議使用者必須透過實體互動才能解鎖啟動載入程式。
- 螢幕鎖定。新增使用防竄改硬體驗證鎖定螢幕憑證的支援功能。
- KeyStore。針對搭載 Android 8.0 以上版本的所有裝置,必須進行金鑰認證。新增ID 認證支援功能,以改善零接觸註冊程序。
- 採用沙箱機制。使用 Project Treble 的標準介面,在架構和裝置專屬元件之間,為許多元件提供更嚴密的沙箱。將 seccomp 篩選功能套用至所有不受信任的應用程式,以減少核心的受攻擊面。WebView 目前會在隔離程序中執行,對系統其他部分的存取權非常有限。
- 核心強化。實作強化的 usercopy、PAN 模擬、啟動後唯讀,以及 KASLR。
- 使用者空間強化。為媒體堆疊實作 CFI。應用程式疊加層無法再覆蓋系統重要視窗,使用者可以關閉疊加層。
- 串流 OS 更新。在磁碟空間不足的裝置上啟用更新。
- 安裝不明應用程式。使用者必須授予權限,才能從非第一方應用程式商店的來源安裝應用程式。
- 隱私權。每個應用程式和裝置上的每位使用者,都有不同的 Android ID (SSAID) 值。針對網頁瀏覽器應用程式,Widevine 用戶端 ID 會針對每個應用程式套件名稱和網頁來源傳回不同的值。
net.hostname
現已空白,且 DHCP 用戶端不再傳送主機名稱。android.os.Build.SERIAL
已改為Build.SERIAL
API,並受到使用者控管的權限保護。改善部分晶片組的 MAC 位址隨機化功能。
Android 7
Every Android release includes dozens of security enhancements to protect users. Here are some of the major security enhancements available in Android 7.0:
- File-based encryption. Encrypting at the file level, instead of encrypting the entire storage area as a single unit, better isolates and protects individual users and profiles (such as personal and work) on a device.
- Direct Boot. Enabled by file-based encryption, Direct Boot allows certain apps such as alarm clock and accessibility features to run when device is powered on but not unlocked.
- Verified Boot. Verified Boot is now strictly enforced to prevent compromised devices from booting; it supports error correction to improve reliability against non-malicious data corruption.
- SELinux. Updated SELinux configuration and increased seccomp coverage further locks down the Application Sandbox and reduces attack surface.
- Library load-order randomization and improved ASLR. Increased randomness makes some code-reuse attacks less reliable.
- Kernel hardening. Added additional memory protection for newer kernels by marking portions of kernel memory as read-only, restricting kernel access to userspace addresses and further reducing the existing attack surface.
- APK signature scheme v2. Introduced a whole-file signature scheme that improves verification speed and strengthens integrity guarantees.
- Trusted CA store. To make it easier for apps to control access to their secure network traffic, user-installed certificate authorities and those installed through Device Admin APIs are no longer trusted by default for apps targeting API Level 24+. Additionally, all new Android devices must ship with the same trusted CA store.
- Network Security Config. Configure network security and TLS through a declarative configuration file.
Android 6
Every Android release includes dozens of security enhancements to protect users. Here are some of the major security enhancements available in Android 6.0:
- Runtime Permissions. Apps request permissions at runtime instead of being granted at App install time. Users can toggle permissions on and off for both M and pre-M apps.
- Verified Boot. A set of cryptographic checks of system software are conducted prior to execution to ensure the phone is healthy from the bootloader all the way up to the operating system.
- Hardware-Isolated Security. New Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL) used by Fingerprint API, Lockscreen, Device Encryption, and Client Certificates to protect keys against kernel compromise and/or local physical attacks
- Fingerprints. Devices can now be unlocked with just a touch. Developers can also take advantage of new APIs to use fingerprints to lock and unlock encryption keys.
- SD Card Adoption. Removable media can be adopted to a device and expand available storage for app local data, photos, videos, etc., but still be protected by block-level encryption.
- Clear Text Traffic. Developers can use a new StrictMode to make sure their app doesn't use cleartext.
- System Hardening. Hardening of the system via policies enforced by SELinux. This offers better isolation between users, IOCTL filtering, reduce threat of exposed services, further tightening of SELinux domains, and extremely limited /proc access.
- USB Access Control: Users must confirm to allow USB access to files, storage, or other functionality on the phone. Default is now charge only with access to storage requiring explicit approval from the user.
Android 5
5.0
Every Android release includes dozens of security enhancements to protect users. Here are some of the major security enhancements available in Android 5.0:
- Encrypted by default. On devices that ship with L out-of-the-box, full disk encryption is enabled by default to improve protection of data on lost or stolen devices. Devices that update to L can be encrypted in Settings > Security .
- Improved full disk encryption. The user password is
protected against brute-force attacks using
scrypt
and, where available, the key is bound to the hardware keystore to prevent off-device attacks. As always, the Android screen lock secret and the device encryption key are not sent off the device or exposed to any application. - Android sandbox reinforced with SELinux . Android now requires SELinux in enforcing mode for all domains. SELinux is a mandatory access control (MAC) system in the Linux kernel used to augment the existing discretionary access control (DAC) security model. This new layer provides additional protection against potential security vulnerabilities.
- Smart Lock. Android now includes trustlets that provide more flexibility for unlocking devices. For example, trustlets can allow devices to be unlocked automatically when close to another trusted device (through NFC, Bluetooth) or being used by someone with a trusted face.
- Multi user, restricted profile, and guest modes for phones and tablets. Android now provides for multiple users on phones and includes a guest mode that can be used to provide easy temporary access to your device without granting access to your data and apps.
- Updates to WebView without OTA. WebView can now be updated independent of the framework and without a system OTA. This allows for faster response to potential security issues in WebView.
- Updated cryptography for HTTPS and TLS/SSL. TLSv1.2 and TLSv1.1 is now enabled, Forward Secrecy is now preferred, AES-GCM is now enabled, and weak cipher suites (MD5, 3DES, and export cipher suites) are now disabled. See https://developer.android.com/reference/javax/net/ssl/SSLSocket.html for more details.
- non-PIE linker support removed. Android now requires all dynamically linked executables to support PIE (position-independent executables). This enhances Android's address space layout randomization (ASLR) implementation.
- FORTIFY_SOURCE improvements. The following libc
functions now implement FORTIFY_SOURCE protections:
stpcpy()
,stpncpy()
,read()
,recvfrom()
,FD_CLR()
,FD_SET()
, andFD_ISSET()
. This provides protection against memory-corruption vulnerabilities involving those functions. - Security Fixes. Android 5.0 also includes fixes for Android-specific vulnerabilities. Information about these vulnerabilities has been provided to Open Handset Alliance members, and fixes are available in Android Open Source Project. To improve security, some devices with earlier versions of Android may also include these fixes.
Android 4 以下版本
每個 Android 版本都包含數十項安全性強化功能,可保護使用者。以下是 Android 4.4 提供的部分安全性強化功能:
- 使用 SELinux 強化 Android 沙箱。Android 現在會在強制執行模式下使用 SELinux。SELinux 是 Linux 核心中的強制存取控制 (MAC) 系統,用於增強現有的以自由選定存取控制 (DAC) 為基礎的安全性模型。這麼做可提供額外防護,避免潛在的安全漏洞。
- 每位使用者 VPN:在多使用者裝置上,現在會為每位使用者套用 VPN。這樣一來,使用者就能將所有網路流量都透過 VPN 路由,不會影響裝置上的其他使用者。
- AndroidKeyStore 中的 ECDSA 供應器支援功能。Android 現在提供可使用 ECDSA 和 DSA 演算法的 KeyStore 供應器。
- 裝置監控警告。 如果有任何憑證已新增至裝置憑證儲存庫,而該憑證可監控加密網路流量,Android 就會向使用者發出警告。
- FORTIFY_SOURCE. Android 現在支援 FORTIFY_SOURCE 等級 2,所有程式碼都會採用這些保護機制編譯。FORTIFY_SOURCE 已強化,可與 clang 搭配使用。
- 憑證綁定Android 4.4 會偵測並防止使用在安全 SSL/TLS 通訊中的詐欺 Google 憑證。
- 安全性修正項目。Android 4.4 也針對 Android 專屬安全漏洞提供修正程式。我們已將這些安全漏洞的相關資訊提供給 Open Handset Alliance 成員,並在 Android 開放原始碼計畫中提供修正程式。為提升安全性,部分搭載舊版 Android 的裝置也可能包含這些修正項目。
Every Android release includes dozens of security enhancements to protect users. The following are some of the security enhancements available in Android 4.3:
- Android sandbox reinforced with SELinux. This release strengthens the Android sandbox using the SELinux mandatory access control system (MAC) in the Linux kernel. SELinux reinforcement is invisible to users and developers, and adds robustness to the existing Android security model while maintaining compatibility with existing apps. To ensure continued compatibility this release allows the use of SELinux in a permissive mode. This mode logs any policy violations, but will not break apps or affect system behavior.
- No
setuid
orsetgid
programs. Added support for filesystem capabilities to Android system files and removed allsetuid
orsetgid
programs. This reduces root attack surface and the likelihood of potential security vulnerabilities. - ADB authentication. Starting in Android 4.2.2, connections to ADB are authenticated with an RSA keypair. This prevents unauthorized use of ADB where the attacker has physical access to a device.
- Restrict Setuid from Android Apps.
The
/system
partition is now mounted nosuid for zygote-spawned processes, preventing Android apps from executingsetuid
programs. This reduces root attack surface and the likelihood of potential security vulnerabilities. - Capability bounding.
Android zygote and ADB now use
prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP)
to drop unnecessary capabilities prior to executing apps. This prevents Android apps and apps launched from the shell from acquiring privileged capabilities. - AndroidKeyStore Provider. Android now has a keystore provider that allows apps to create exclusive use keys. This provides apps with an API to create or store private keys that cannot be used by other apps.
- KeyChain
isBoundKeyAlgorithm
. Keychain API now provides a method (isBoundKeyType
) that allows apps to confirm that system-wide keys are bound to a hardware root of trust for the device. This provides a place to create or store private keys that can't be exported off the device, even in the event of a root compromise. NO_NEW_PRIVS
. Android zygote now usesprctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS)
to block addition of new privileges prior to execution app code. This prevents Android apps from performing operations that can elevate privileges through execve. (This requires Linux kernel version 3.5 or greater).FORTIFY_SOURCE
enhancements. EnabledFORTIFY_SOURCE
on Android x86 and MIPS and fortifiedstrchr()
,strrchr()
,strlen()
, andumask()
calls. This can detect potential memory corruption vulnerabilities or unterminated string constants.- Relocation protections. Enabled read only relocations (relro) for statically linked executables and removed all text relocations in Android code. This provides defense in depth against potential memory corruption vulnerabilities.
- Improved EntropyMixer. EntropyMixer now writes entropy at shutdown or reboot, in addition to periodic mixing. This allows retention of all entropy generated while devices are powered on, and is especially useful for devices that are rebooted immediately after provisioning.
- Security fixes. Android 4.3 also includes fixes for Android-specific vulnerabilities. Information about these vulnerabilities has been provided to Open Handset Alliance members and fixes are available in Android Open Source Project. To improve security, some devices with earlier versions of Android may also include these fixes.
Android provides a multi-layered security model described in the Android Security Overview. Each update to Android includes dozens of security enhancements to protect users. The following are some of the security enhancements introduced in Android 4.2:
- App verification: Users can choose to enable Verify Apps and have apps screened by an app verifier, prior to installation. App verification can alert the user if they try to install an app that might be harmful; if an app is especially bad, it can block installation.
- More control of premium SMS: Android provides a notification if an app attempts to send SMS to a short code that uses premium services that might cause additional charges. The user can choose whether to allow the app to send the message or block it.
- Always-on VPN: VPN can be configured so that apps won't have access to the network until a VPN connection is established. This prevents apps from sending data across other networks.
- Certificate pinning: The Android core libraries now support certificate pinning. Pinned domains receive a certificate validation failure if the certificate doesn't chain to a set of expected certificates. This protects against possible compromise of certificate authorities.
- Improved display of Android permissions: Permissions are organized into groups that are more easily understood by users. During review of the permissions, the user can click on the permission to see more detailed information about the permission.
- installd hardening: The
installd
daemon does not run as the root user, reducing potential attack surface for root privilege escalation. - init script hardening: init scripts now apply
O_NOFOLLOW
semantics to prevent symlink related attacks. FORTIFY_SOURCE
: Android now implementsFORTIFY_SOURCE
. This is used by system libraries and apps to prevent memory corruption.- ContentProvider default configuration: Apps that target API
level 17 have
export
set tofalse
by default for each Content Provider, reducing default attack surface for apps. - Cryptography: Modified the default implementations of SecureRandom and Cipher.RSA to use OpenSSL. Added SSL Socket support for TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2 using OpenSSL 1.0.1
- Security fixes: Upgraded open source libraries with security fixes include WebKit, libpng, OpenSSL, and LibXML. Android 4.2 also includes fixes for Android-specific vulnerabilities. Information about these vulnerabilities has been provided to Open Handset Alliance members and fixes are available in Android Open Source Project. To improve security, some devices with earlier versions of Android may also include these fixes.
Android provides a multi-layered security model described in the Android Security Overview. Each update to Android includes dozens of security enhancements to protect users. The following are some of the security enhancements introduced in Android versions 1.5 through 4.1:
- Android 1.5
- ProPolice to prevent stack buffer overruns (-fstack-protector)
- safe_iop to reduce integer overflows
- Extensions to OpenBSD dlmalloc to prevent double free() vulnerabilities and to prevent chunk consolidation attacks. Chunk consolidation attacks are a common way to exploit heap corruption.
- OpenBSD calloc to prevent integer overflows during memory allocation
- Android 2.3
- Format string vulnerability protections (-Wformat-security -Werror=format-security)
- Hardware-based No eXecute (NX) to prevent code execution on the stack and heap
- Linux mmap_min_addr to mitigate null pointer dereference privilege escalation (further enhanced in Android 4.1)
- Android 4.0
- Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) to randomize key locations in memory
- Android 4.1
- PIE (Position Independent Executable) support
- Read-only relocations / immediate binding (-Wl,-z,relro -Wl,-z,now)
- dmesg_restrict enabled (avoid leaking kernel addresses)
- kptr_restrict enabled (avoid leaking kernel addresses)