In Keymaster 1, all keymaster keys were cryptographically bound to the device Root of Trust, or the verified boot key. In Keymaster 2 and above, all keys are also bound to the operating system and patch level of the system image. This ensures that an attacker who discovers a weakness in an old version of system or TEE software cannot roll a device back to the vulnerable version and use keys created with the newer version. In addition, when a key with a given version and patch level is used on a device that has been upgraded to a newer version or patch level, the key is upgraded before it can be used, and the previous version of the key invalidated. In this way, as the device is upgraded, the keys will "ratchet" forward along with the device, but any reversion of the device to a previous release will cause the keys to be unusable.
To support version binding and version attestation, Android 7.1 added the tags
Tag::OS_PATCHLEVEL and the
upgradeKey. The version tags
are automatically added by Keymaster 2+ implementations to all newly-generated (or
updated) keys. Further, any attempt to use a key that does not have an OS
version or patch level matching the current system OS version or patch level,
respectively, is rejected with
Tag::OS_VERSION is a
UINT that represents the
major, minor, and sub-minor portions of an Android system version as MMmmss,
where MM is the major version, mm is the minor version and ss is the sub-minor
version. For example 6.1.2 would be represented as 060102.
Tag::OS_PATCHLEVEL is a
UINT that represents the
year and month of the last update to the system as YYYYMM, where YYYY is the
four-digit year and MM is the two-digit month. For example, March 2016 would be
represented as 201603.
To allow keys to be upgraded to the new OS version and patch level of the system
image, Android 7.1 added the
upgradeKey method to the HAL:
keyBlobToUpgrade, vec upgradeParams) generates(ErrorCode error, vec upgradedKeyBlob);
keymaster_error_t (*upgrade_key)(const struct keymaster2_device* dev, const keymaster_key_blob_t* key_to_upgrade, const keymaster_key_param_set_t* upgrade_params, keymaster_key_blob_t* upgraded_key);
devis the device structure
keyBlobToUpgradeis the key which needs to be upgraded
upgradeParamsare parameters needed to upgrade the key. These will include
Tag::APPLICATION_DATA, which are necessary to decrypt the key blob, if they were provided during generation.
upgradedKeyBlobis the output parameter, used to return the new key blob.
upgradeKey is called with a key blob that cannot be parsed or
is otherwise invalid, it returns
ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB. If it
is called with a key whose patch level is greater than the current system value,
ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT. If it is called with a key
whose OS version is greater than the current system value, and the system value
is non-zero, it returns
ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT. OS version
upgrades from non-zero to zero are allowed. In the event of errors
communicating with the secure world, it returns an appropriate error value (e.g.
Otherwise, it returns
ErrorCode::OK and returns a new key blob in
keyBlobToUpgrade remains valid after the
call, and could theoretically be used again if the device were downgraded. In
practice, keystore generally calls
deleteKey on the
keyBlobToUpgrade blob shortly after the call to
keyBlobToUpgrade had tag
upgradedKeyBlob should have it as well (and should be rollback
Note: Keymaster 3 removed the Keymaster 2 method
configure. The information previously provided to Keymaster HALs
configure is available in system properties files, and
manufacturer implementations read those files during startup.
To implement version binding, the keymaster TA needs a way to securely receive the current OS version and patch level (version information), and to ensure that the information it receives strongly matches the information about the running system.
To support secure delivery of version information to the TA, an
field has been added to the boot image header. The boot image build
script automatically populates this field. OEMs and keymaster TA implementers
need to work together to modify device bootloaders to extract the version
information from the boot image and pass it to the TA before the non-secure
system is booted. This ensures that attackers cannot interfere with provisioning
of version information to the TA.
It is also necessary to ensure that the system image has the same version information as the boot image. To that end, the configure method has been added to the keymaster HAL:
keymaster_error_t (*configure)(const struct keymaster2_device* dev, const keymaster_key_param_set_t* params);
params argument contains
Tag::OS_PATCHLEVEL. This method is called by keymaster2 clients
after opening the HAL, but before calling any other methods. If any other method
is called before configure, the TA returns
The first time
configure is called after the device boots, it
should verify that the version information provided matches what was provided by
the bootloader. If the version information does not match,
ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT, and all
other keymaster methods continue returning
ErrorCode::KEYMASTER_NOT_CONFIGURED. If the information matches,
ErrorCode::OK, and other keymaster
methods begin functioning normally.
Subsequent calls to
configure return the same value returned by the
first call, and do not change the state of keymaster. Note that this process
will REQUIRErequire that all OTAs update both system and boot images; they can't
be updated separately in order to keep the version information in sync.
configure will be called by the system whose contents it is
intended to validate, there is a narrow window of opportunity for an attacker to
compromise the system image and force it to provide version information that
matches the boot image, but which is not the actual version of the system. The
combination of boot image verification, dm-verity validation of the system image
contents, and the fact that
configure is called very early in the
system boot should make this window of opportunity difficult to exploit.